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THE INVENTORY SEARCH OF AN AUTOMOBILE:
A WILLING SUSPENSION OF DISBELIEF*
Charles E. Moylan, Jr.t
Evidence seized from automobiles under the guise of an
automobile inventory search has often been admitted against
criminal defendants. This article analyzes the doctrinal basis
behind the inventory search, the justifications for its use and
concludes that the inventory search is a subterfuge for an
unlawful entry into a constitutionallyprotected area.
With the possible exception of "dropsy" cases,' no aspect of Fourth
Amendment litigation has afflicted law enforcement with the yawning
credibility gap wrought by automobile inventory searches, that is, the
examination and listing of the contents of an automobile by the police
when it is taken into police custody. This article will attempt to explore
briefly three aspects of that insidious device, which has two ostensible
purposes: to protect the personal property of the vehicle's owner and
to protect the police against false claims of theft.2 Initially, an attempt
will be made to place the inventory search of an automobile in its
proper analytical framework. Secondly, the doctrinal status of the
inventory search in Maryland will be examined, with a view towards the
constitutional erosion of its base. Thirdly, a brief look will be had at
the suspect nature of the inventory search generally.

*This article will appear as a chapter in a forthcoming book by the author, who retains
full copyright privileges herein.
tB.A., 1952, Johns Hopkins University; J.D., 1955, University of Maryland; Associate
Judge, Maryland Court of Special Appeals, 1970-.
1. For an incisive analysis of this remarkable phenomenon, see the opinion of Judge Irving
Younger in People v. McMurty, 64 Misc. 2d 63, 314 N.Y.S.2d 194 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct.
1970). See generally Comment, Police Perjury in Narcotics "Dropsy" Cases: A New
Credibility Gap, 60 GEORGETOWN L.J. 507 (1971).

2. See, e.g., St. Clair v. State, 1 Md. App. 605, 614-15, 232 A.2d 565, 570 (1967). See also
Dixon v. State, 23 Md. App. 19, 39, 327 A.2d 516, 527 (1974).
This attack on the constitutionality and the basic intellectual integrity of the
inventory search is not intended to apply to the inventorying of the contents of
abandoned automobiles where owners cannot be located or of disabled automobiles that
have to be towed from accident scenes. Neither is this article addressing itself to the
inventorying of the personal effects of an arrestee, taken from him when he is placed in
custody.
The attitude of the author toward the inventory search of an automobile is
unabashedly editorial. It is based upon the author's personal experience, both upon -the
bench and in twelve years with a prosecutor's office, with policemen, prosecutors and
judges. The attitude of the "apologists" for the inventory search, and their use of the
device has been made apparent both in practice and in hundreds of schools, seminars,
lectures and question and answer sessions dealing with search and seizure.
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WHAT IS AN INVENTORY SEARCH ANALYTICALLY?
The basic thrust of the Fourth Amendment is that an investigator
must obtain a warrant issued by a "neutral and detached" magistrate
before intruding into a constitutionally protected area in search of
evidence.' There are a few well-recognized exceptions to that warrant
requirement permitting warrantless intrusions generally where circumstances make it impossible or impractical to obtain a warrant. 4 One of
these recognized exceptions is the Carroll Doctrine or "automobile
exception." ' Because the inventory search of an automobile and the
"automobile exception" both involve automobiles, there is a semantic
tendency to try to merge the two constitutionally distinct phenomena
into a single doctrine. The first impediment that must be removed
before one can understand conceptually the inventory search is the
mistaken notion that the inventory search of an automobile somehow
involves this "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement. It
most emphatically does not. Before we can understand what an
inventory search of an automobile is, in terms of doctrinal significance,
we must understand what it is not.
For some strange reason our intellectual faculties seem to fail us
when we focus upon a confrontation between a criminal investigator
and a motorcar. If the word "automobile" is not "a talisman in whose
presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears, '"6 neither
should it be a talisman in whose presence all capacity for legal analysis
fades away and disappears. An automobile (or automobile equivalent,
such as a truck, bus, wagon, boat or airplane) is simply one more
constitutionally protected area, having a unique characteristic to be
sure, but broadly sharing the vicissitudes of other constitutionally
protected areas. Fundamentally, it enjoys Fourth Amendment protection; under appropriate circumstances, it is vulnerable to intrusions that
fall within the permission of the Fourth Amendment.
Yet the mere testimonial mention of the word "automobile"
frequently provokes a judicial knee-jerk. Many judges simplistically
"lock in" on "automobile exception" diagnosis according to Carroll v.
United States' and Chambers v. Maroney8 and will not budge from
that analytical set. Restricting themselves doggedly to one track, they
refuse to grasp that the review of every search of an automobile and
3. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
4. For a brief discussion of each of these exceptions, see notes 9-29 infra and accompanying
text.
5. The "automobile exception" was specifically established in 1925 in Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). The holding of Carroll was that 1) probable cause to believe
that the vehicle contains evidence of crime and 2) exigent circumstances may justify the
warrantless search of an automobile. The "automobile exception" has since been
well-delineated in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), and Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
6. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 461-62.
7. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
8. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
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every seizure from an automobile need not proceed under the
"automobile exception." There are cases involving automobile searches
where citation to Carroll and Chambers ought not to intrude into the
remotest footnote. An inventory search is one of them.
The source of the confusion is unquestionably the trick the mind can
play in mistaking the functional category "automobile" for the
analytical category "automobile." To be an automobile for one purpose
is not necessarily to be an automobile for the other purpose. From an
analytical viewpoint, many police examinations of the interior of a
functional automobile have nothing whatever to do with the "automobile exception." The confusion could be avoided if lawyers and
courts would scrupulously remember that what triggers an "automobile
exception" analysis is not the functional presence of an internal
combustion engine connected to a set of wheels, but rather the arguable
presence of both 1) probable cause to believe that the automobile
contains evidence of a crime and 2) exigent circumstances arising out of
the mobility of the automobile and its consequently likely disappearance if the search is not executed immediately.9 Reverting to the older
usage of Carroll Doctrine as the appropriate label for this exception to
the warrant requirement would relieve much of the confusion.
The Carroll Doctrine exception (or "automobile exception") to the
warrant requirement is, of course, but one of at least six recognized
exceptions."
A legitimate search may occur and a legitimate seizure
may take place, even inside an automobile, under any of these
exceptions-not simply under the Carroll Doctrine.
1. Sometimes a probing into the interior of an automobile does
involve the Carroll Doctrine. These warrantless searches have been dealt
with by the Supreme Court in Carroll v. United States;1' Husty v.
United States; 2 Scher v. United States; 3 Brinegarv. United States; 4
and Chambers v. Maroney. "
2. On the other hand, a probing into the interior of an automobile
may not involve the Carroll Doctrine but may instead provoke analysis
under the "search incident to a lawful arrest" exception to the warrant
requirement. 6 These situations have been dealt with by the Supreme
Court in Preston v. United States 7 and Dyke v. Taylor Implement
9. Id. at 51.
10. The other five are: 1) search incident to lawful arrest, 2) "hot pursuit," 3) "stop and
frisk," 4) the "plain view" doctrine and 5) consent. For a brief discussion of each of
these exceptions, see notes 16-29 infra and accompanying text.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

267 U.S.
282 U.S.
305 U.S.
338 U.S.
399 U.S.

132 (1925).
694 (1931).
251 (1938).
160 (1949).
42 (1970).

16. The "search incident" exception permits a warrantless search of the area within the
reach, lunge or grasp of an arrestee following a lawful arrest. The purposes are to prevent
the arrestee from using a possible weapon to injure the officer or make good an escape
and to prevent him from destroying readily accessible evidence. Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
17. 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
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Manufacturing Company." Maryland has also analyzed entries into the
interior of an automobile under "search incident" analysis.1 9
3. Sometimes a probing into the interior of an automobile will invite
analysis under the "stop and frisk" exception to the warrant requirement. 0 The Supreme Court has dealt with this situation in Adams v.
Williams2" and United States v. Brignoni-Ponce.2 2 Maryland has also
analyzed the entry into an automobile under the "stop and frisk"
exception in Williams v. State.2 3
4. A probing into the interior of an automobile also may be
analyzed under the "plain view" doctrine exception to the warrant
requirement.2 4 The Supreme Court did this explicitly in Harris v.
United States25 and implicitly in Cady v.Dombrowski.2 6
5. Sometimes a probing into the interior of an automobile will be
analyzed under the "consent" exception to the warrant requirement.2 7
This type of analysis was made by the Supreme Court in Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte.2 8
6. Although no case has been decided by the Supreme Court
involving the "hot pursuit" of a fleeing felon into the interior of a
vehicle, it is clear that the rationale of Warden v. Hayden, 9 which
permits officers in "hot pursuit" to cross the threshold of fixed
premises, would, a fortiori, permit the crossing of this lesser threshold.
A particular automobile search may require analysis under more than
one of the doctrines listed above. In Coolidge v.New Hampshire,3" a
probing into the interior of an automobile was analyzed under three
distinct and independent Fourth Amendment doctrines-under "search
18. 391 U.S. 216 (1968).
19. Howell v. State, 18 Md. App. 429, 306 A.2d 554 (1973), reversed on factual grounds in
Howell v. State, 271 Md. 378, 318 A.2d 189 (1974), but the frame of analysis remained
the same. See also Peterson v. State, 15 Md. App. 478, 481-93, 292 A.2d 714, 717-23
(1972).
20. This exception to the warrant requirement, articulated by the Supreme Court in Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), permits an
officer, upon a reasonable suspicion less than probable cause, 1) temporarily to detain a
suspect and ask him questions and 2) to carry out a "frisk" for weapons, limited in scope
to a pat-down of the outer surface of the clothing.
21. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
22. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
23. 19 Md. App. 204, 310 A.2d 593 (1973).
24. The "plain view" doctrine, articulated in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971), permits a warrantless seizure of evidence where 1) there has been a prior valid
intrusion into a constitutionally protected area, 2) there is then an inadvertent spotting
of the evidence in plain view and 3) there is probable cause to believe that the thing
spotted is evidence of crime.
25. 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
26. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
27. This exception simply provides that the right to be free of an unreasonable search and
seizure, like any other constitutional right, may be waived by the person enjoying the
right. The only qualification is that the consent be "voluntary" as that term is defined in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
28. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
29. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
30. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
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incident" law in Part IIA of that opinion, under the Carroll Doctrine in
Part IIB and under the "plain view" doctrine in Part IIC.
It follows, then, that an inventory search of an automobile need not
be subjected to analysis under the Carroll Doctrine simply because a
wheeled vehicle is the situs of the inventory; an inventory search is,
instead, the antithesis of a Carroll Doctrine search. The inventory
search, by definition, purports to be a mere listing of personal property
and not a deliberate search for evidence; the Carroll Doctrine search is a
deliberate search for evidence. An inventory search is not based upon
probable cause-probable cause is an irrelevant notion; a Carroll
Doctrine search must rest upon probable cause. The inventory search
need not depend upon any exigency-the non-likelihood that the
owner's relatives or agents will call for the car ostensibly heightens the
need for the protective inventory; the Carroll Doctrine search is
absolutely dependent upon exigency. Once one gets beyond their
surface similarity, the inventory search and the Carroll Doctrine search
are diametrically opposed in every doctrinal respect. When one sees,
therefore, Carroll or Chambers cited in support of an inventory search,
it is meet to look politely for the nearest wastebasket. Someone has
scrambled the eggs of Fourth Amendment analysis.
If an inventory search of an automobile is not a Carroll Doctrine
search, what then is it? Assuming for the moment that the making of an
inventory is a legitimate excuse for intruding into the constitutionally
protected area of one's automobile,3" then it is clear that there is a
prior valid intrusion-one of the necessary conditions to bring into play
the "plain view" doctrine as outlined by Coolidge.32 If, following the
valid intrusion for this innocuous and non-investigative purpose, there is
then an inadvertent spotting of probable evidence in plain view, the
evidence is seizable under the "plain view" doctrine.3 3 Seizures in the
course 6f inventory searches must, therefore, be analyzed under the
"plain view" doctrine.
The constitutional problem with respect to the analysis of an
inventory search under the "plain view" doctrine is not what follows a
prior valid intrusion but rather whether the purpose of inventorying
personal property inside an automobile can give rise to a constitutionally valid intrusion in the first place.
THE AUTOMOBILE INVENTORY IN MARYLAND
The theory underlying an inventory search is that a policeman, when
he takes a motorist into custody, should make an inventory of the
contents of the automobile. In theory, this is not a search for evidence.
It is an effort to protect the personal property of the motorist against
loss. According to the accepted fiction, a written inventory will always
31. This very important question is discussed infra, beginning at p. 216.

32. 403 U.S. at 466.
33. Id. at 469.
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be prepared and a copy will always be given to the motorist. With the
police department thus committed in writing, the motorist theoretically
can rest assured that an over-greedy policeman will not take advantage
of the motorist's plight to abscond with an attractive chattel. The
theory does not explain how one guards against the policeman-thief
who has foresight enough to leave off the inventory list the items he
wishes to convert to his own use.
The apologists for the inventory search posit that it serves another
interest. In addition to protecting the motorist from theft, so runs the
argument, it also protects the police department from false charges of
theft. According to the fiction, a plaintiff who claims the loss of
personal property at the hands of the 3161ice would be precluded from
recovering if the police could produce an inventory list showing that
the personal property was not in the automobile when it first came into
the custody of the police. The apologists do not explain how this
self-serving declaration could ever be admitted into evidence or could
ever be entitled to any persuasive weight.3 4
Inventory searches in Maryland rest ultimately upon the single
authority of St. Clair v. State.3 Before looking to the doctrinal base of
St. Clair, which appears to have been totally eroded, a look at its facts
is enough to reveal the essential duplicity of the police in conducting an
inventory search.
In the St. Clair case, a Virginia State Police trooper on routine patrol
at 11:15 a.m. observed an automobile, bearing Alabama license tags,
parked beside the road near the town of Salem in Roanoke County. He
aroused the sleeping driver, who produced his California driver's license
and his registration papers for the vehicle, showing it to have been titled
to him in Alabama. The trooper meanwhile had observed two television
sets in open view on the floor of the vehicle. The driver explained that
he owned both of the television sets and that he had come from
California via Alabama to look for work in the Maryland-Virginia area.
He explained that he had arrived late at night and had wanted to avoid
awakening relatives with whom he intended to stay, who lived a short
distance away. The trooper knew of the driver's relatives and that they
lived in the immediate vicinity. Satisfied with the driver's explanation,
the trooper began to drive away. 6
As he was leaving the scene, the trooper checked with his dispatcher
by police radio. He learned that the driver was wanted by California
authorities for violation of parole and burglary. The trooper immediately stopped the defendant, who was then just driving off, and
informed him of a teletyped message for his arrest. The trooper
informed the defendant that he would be taken before a justice of the
peace in nearby Salem. The driver asked permission to remove an article
34. See E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF
a discussion of interest-serving statements.
35. 1 Md. App. 605, 232 A.2d 565 (1967).
36. Id. at 608, 232 A.2d at 567.

THE LAW OF EVIDENCE

144 (2d ed. 1972), for
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of clothing from the trunk of the car. When the trunk lid was raised,
the trooper observed several articles in the trunk which he believed the
driver owned. 3"
The defendant was arrested and transported to Salem, twelve miles
from the scene of the arrest. It was determined that California would
extradite. It was also learned that Texas wished to extradite St. Clair
for a burglary allegedly perpetrated by him in that state.38
When the defendant was unable to post the necessary bond, he was
incarcerated in the Salem jail. The state trooper, accompanied by a
sergeant, drove back to the arrest scene so that the sergeant could drive
the defendant's car into Salem. The car was brought to Salem and
parked near the jail. Trooper Rhodenizer testified that "because we
were responsible for them," the items of personal property in the
defendant's vehicle were inventoried by serial number and placed in the
custody of the local sheriff.3 9
The credibility of the police as to their concern over the security of
the property was eroded somewhat when, four days later, the sheriff,
because of a shortage of space in his office, returned the goods to the
police who placed them back inside the defendant's car, which was still
parked adjacent to the jail. Skepticism as to the true police motive is
increased by the actions of the police on August 19, when the list of
the articles taken from the car was "run on the teletype as police
information, found." 4
Trooper Rhodenizer testified that this was
done "just for general police information over the teletype network." '
What purpose it served in preserving the integrity of
presumptively innocuous personal property being safeguarded for the
benefit of the motorist was not explained. In response to that routine
teletype, it was learned that the various articles taken from the trunk of
the defendant's car had been stolen in Maryland.4 2 This information
formed the basis for the ultimate Maryland conviction.
The thrust of this article is not to quarrel with the St. Clair decision
itself. It was unquestionably good law when it was announced. St. Clair,
however, as a fair representative of hundreds of cases like it, well
illustrates the galling gap between the pose of the police and what one
instinctively knows is their true purpose. The fairy tale would have us
believe that the police are interested solely and exclusively in
safeguarding personal property and are naively surprised when their
"safeguarding" efforts turn up evidence of crime. The strange thing
about the "safeguarding" is that no effort is ever made to have the
arrested driver lock the vehicle and park it in a safe place to his own
satisfaction; to drive it or have the police drive it to some nearby and
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 609, 232 A.2d at 567.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 610, 232 A.2d at 568.
Id.
Id. at 609-10, 232 A.2d 567-68.
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convenient relative or friend or storage facility; to have a relative, friend
or attorney come and pick it up so as to relieve the police of their
presumably onerous "safeguarding" responsibilities; or to inquire of the
arrested driver in any way as to his wish, with respect to his non-suspect
property. Universally, the police studiously avoid all such "safeguarding" alternatives and resort to the single mode of "safeguarding," that
also incidentally permits them to get a good look at the interior of the
car and its contents, even when this mode is far from the most
convenient. The notion that the criminal evidence they then turn up
amounts to no more than an unexpected boon strains credulity. A law
that permits the police frankly and openly to tear a car apart for
possible criminal evidence when a driver is arrested would not be as
offensive as the patent intellectual fraud underlying the "inventory"
rationale. Everyone knows the real purpose, but police, prosecutors and
judges alike play their assigned roles with absolutely straight faces.
The "tip-off" to the real police purpose is what happens when
evidence of crime is "inadvertently" discovered in the course of making
the inventory. Just this situation occurred in Dixon v.State,4 3 causing
the Court of Special Appeals to remark:
Curiously, no inventory list was ever turned over to the
appellant or produced in court. Apparently none was ever
made. In terms of the officer's attentions, solicitude for
personalty was easily cuckolded and lightly forgotten once the
more attractive rival of the seizure of potentially incriminating
evidence appeared in the field. In the light of such easy
inconstancy of purpose, it is difficult to credit significantly the
asserted initial commitment. As the officer acknowledged on
cross-examination:
"Q. So you really didn't take it for his safekeeping? Correct?
You took it as evidence,
isn't that correct?
44
A. That's correct."
In the St. Clair case itself, the Virginia state trooper testified that St.
Clair had told him that St. Clair wanted his brother-in-law to have the
vehicle. The trooper even assisted St. Clair in drawing up papers giving
to the brother-in-law the power of attorney to get a Virginia title. All of
this was done, however, after the contents of the automobile had been
inventoried. When the trooper was asked whether St. Clair had said
anything with respect to the contents of the car, he replied, "No, not
specifically. He mentioned his sister and he indicated that he would like
her to get what he had."'4' The trooper, persisting that he felt
"responsible" for the contents of the car, testified that the local
43. 23 Md. App. 19, 327 A.2d 516 (1974).
44. Id. at 40, 327 A.2d at 528.
45. 1 Md. App. at 610, 232 A.2d at 568.
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practice was "to inventory 46
each item that we find in the vehicle and
leave them for safekeeping."
St. Clair himself testified that, immediately after his arrest, he asked
permission to drive the car to the home of his relatives, approximately
one-quarter of a mile from the point of arrest. He was refused such
47
permission and instead was told to "leave it there and lock it up."
Notwithstanding his protestations that "one door won't lock and I've
got some stuff in it I don't want nobody to take, '4 the car was left at
the roadside as St. Clair was taken to his place of arrest in Salem twelve
miles away. 49 The trooper and his sergeant then had to double back
that twelve miles to pick the car up and return it an additional twelve
miles to Salem." ° Why driving it the one-quarter of a mile to the
relatives' home would not have been more acceptable to all parties was
never explained. This would have satisfied St. Clair and would have
relieved the police of all responsibility for the vehicle and its contents.
The ostensible purposes of an inventory search would have been served
in a far more efficient manner.
St. Clair testified further that he gave the keys to his car to the
trooper and told the trooper to give the keys to St. Clair's brother-inlaw so that the brother-in-law could drive the car to his house."1 The
police persisted, nevertheless, in driving out and retrieving the car
themselves, further disregarding the arrestee's wishes.
The evidence demonstrated and the court found that St. Clair
consented neither to the inventory nor to the removal of the articles
from his car.5 2 In the automobile inventory cases generally, this failure
to give the motorist any option as to an act which, in theory, is being
done exclusively for his own protection is a curious anomaly that the
fiction does not seek to explain.
The evidence also revealed and the court found that no search
warrant was obtained, because Trooper Rhodenizer had testified that,
"[h]e had no reason to suspect that any items in the car were
stolen." 3 The selfsame lack of probable cause also precluded any
reliance upon the Carroll Doctrine. The St. Clair opinion also held,
quite properly, that the search of the automobile and the seizure of its
contents could not be justified as a search incident to lawful arrest. The
police, indeed, had expressly disavowed making any "search" of the
vehicle, either incidental to the arrest or otherwise. The police chose to
rely exclusively on the inventory rationale of safekeeping the vehicle
and its contents. According to all of the police testimony, they

46. Id.
47. Id.

48. Id.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 610-11, 232 A.2d at 568.
Id. at 609, 232 A.2d at 567.
Id. at 611, 232 A.2d at 568.
Id. at 610, 612, 232 A.2d at 568, 569.
Id. at 610, 232 A.2d at 568.
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"entertained a bona fide belief that the appellant owned both the
vehicle and its contents. . . .""
The St. Clair opinion relied exclusively upon the inventory rationale,
5
looking secondarily to Cooper v. California
" and primarily to United
6
States v. Rabinowitz
and its progeny for authority. 7 Not simply the
St. Clair decision but the inventory search apologists generally seek
their initial solace in Cooper. It affords none. Cooper pointed out that
Preston v. United States,5 8 in rejecting the government's alternative
theory of the case, had settled in the negative any idea that the police
could routinely seize or search a vehicle after having arrested the driver
and passengers.
In Preston, the occupants of an automobile were arrested late at
night for vagrancy. The police towed their car to the police station. The
Cooper court, in rejecting the proposition advanced by the State that
the police could process the car just because it was in their physical
custody, commented on Preston, stating:
In the Preston case, it was alternatively argued that the
warrantless search, after the arrest was over and while Preston's
car was being held for him by the police, was justified because
the officers had probable cause to believe the car was stolen.
But the police arrested Preston for vagrancy, not theft, and no
claim was made that the police had authority to hold his car on
that charge. The search was therefore to be treated as though
his car was in his own or his agent's possession, safe from
intrusions by the police or anyone else. 9
The court went on:
Preston was arrested for vagrancy. An arresting officer took his
car to the station rather than just leaving it on the street. It was
not suggested that this was done other than for Preston's
convenience or that the police had any right to impound the car
and keep it from Preston or whomever he might send for it. The
fact that the police had custody of Preston's car was totally
unrelated to the vagrancy charge for which they arrested him.
So was their subsequent search of the car.6"
In Cooper, on the other hand, the arrest was for a narcotics violation.
The controlling factor in the case was that a California forfeiture
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 612, 232 A.2d at 569.
386 U.S. 58 (1967).
339 U.S. 56 (1950).
1 Md. App. at 613-17, 232 A.2d at 569-72.
376 U.S. 364 (1964).
386 U.S. at 59-60.
Id. at 61.
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statute required the police to "seize and deliver to the State Division of
Narcotic Enforcement any vehicle used to store, conceal, transport, sell
or facilitate the possession of narcotics, such vehicle 'to be held as
evidence until a forfeiture has been declared or a release ordered.' "161
The court was careful to catalogue the special circumstances legitimizing the warrantless search of the vehicle:
Here the officers seized petitioner's car because they were
required to do so by state law. They seized it because of the
crime for which they arrested petitioner. They seized it to
impound it and they had to keep it until forfeiture proceedings
were concluded. Their subsequent search of the car.., was
closely related to the reason petitioner was arrested, the reason
his car had been impounded, and the reason it was being
retained. The forfeiture of the petitioner's car did not take
place until over four months after it was lawfully seized. It
would be unreasonable to hold that the police, having to retain
the car in their custody for such a length 6of time, had no right,
even for their own protection, to search it. 1
Cooper is starkly distinguishable from the myriad of cases and
situations that have purported to lean upon it, including St. Clair. As
Cooper made clear, in quoting with approval the lower California court:
[L]awful custody of an automobile does not of itself dispense
with constitutional requirements of searches thereafter made of
it ... 63

In addition to Cooper, St. Clair relied fundamentally upon the then
indispensable authority of United States v. Rabinowitz. 64 St. Clair
cited a number of other state and federal cases 6 but each of these, in
turn, is discovered to have been based upon the authority of
Rabinowitz. The Rabinowitz rationale is, thus, the sine qua non of St.
Clair. Rabinowitz, of course, was the "search incident" case that
commanded that hotly disputed field from 1950 to 1969,66 the period
within which St. Clair was decided. The rhetoric of Rabinowitz on
which the inventory search rationale, both here and elsewhere, was
61. Id. at 60.
62. Id. at 61-62.
63. Id. at 61.

64. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
65. Cotton v. United States, 371 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1967); Fagundes v. United States, 340
F.2d 673 (1st Cir. 1965); People v. Prochnau, 251 Cal. App. 2d 22, 59 Cal. Rptr. 265
(1967); People v. Ortiz, 147 Cal. App. 2d 248, 305 P.2d 145 (1956); Heffley v. State, 83
Nev. 100, 423 P.2d 666 (1967).
66. Rabinowitz was the "broad scope" search incident phase which replaced the "narrow
scope" phase of Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), and was, in turn,
replaced by the next "narrow scope" phase of Chimel v. California, supra, in 1969. See
Brown v. State, 15 Md. App. 584, 292 A.2d 762 (1972).
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erected was to the effect that the ultimate Fourth Amendment test "is
not whether it is reasonable
to procure a search warrant, but whether
' 67
the search was reasonable.
In the wake of Rabinowitz, a school of thought arose applying what
68
the Supreme Court, in Chimel v. California,
termed "the abstract
doctrine of that case," to "various factual situations with divergent
results." 6 9 In referring, by way of example, to the indiscriminate
extension to searches of homes following street arrests, the Court
pointed out that "[s] ome courts have carried the Rabinowitz approach
to just such lengths. '7' As the Court ultimately concluded in Chimel,
"[elven limited to its own facts, the Rabinowitz decision was, as we
have seen, hardly founded on an unimpeachable line of authority." 7
The criticism of the loose approach of Rabinowitz was intense in the
academic community.72
In 1969, Chimel flatly repudiated the loose and "unconfined"
approach of Rabinowitz. It pointed out that what is "reasonable" in a
particular situation "must be viewed in the light of established Fourth
Amendment principles."7 3 It rejected the general approach of asking
simply whether police conduct was "reasonable" as "little more than a
subjective view regarding the acceptability of certain sorts of police
conduct, and not [an approach based] on considerations relevant to
Fourth Amendment interests. ' 74 It pointed out that "[u]nder such an
unconfined analysis, Fourth Amendment protection in this area would
approach the evaporation point."7'
It did not distinguish Rabinowitz
but flatly overruled it, holding:
It would be possible, of course, to draw a line between
Rabinowitz and Harris on the one hand, and this case on the
other.... But such a distinction would be highly artificial. The
rationale that allowed the searches and seizures in Rabinowitz
and Harris would allow the searches and seizures in this
case ....

Rabinowitz and Harris have been the subject of critical
commentary for many years, and have been relied upon less and
less in our own decisions. It is time, for the reasons we have
67. 339 U.S. at 60.

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

395 U.S. 752 (1969).
Id. at 760, n. 4.
Id. at 765, n. 10.
Id. at 760.
See J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 87-117 (1966); Way,
IncreasingScope of Search Incidental to Arrest, 1959 WASH. U.L.Q. 261 (1959); Note,
Scope Limitations for Searches Incident to Arrest, 78 YALE L.J. 433 (1969); Note, The
Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 117-22 (1967).
73. 395 U.S. at 765.
74. Id. at 764-65.
75. Id. at 765.
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stated, to hold that on their own facts, and insofar as the
principles they stand for are inconsistent with those that we
have endorsed today, they are no longer to be followed.7 6
Under the common law doctrine of stare decisis, we follow not
decided cases as such but rather underlying rules of law, of which the
decided cases are merely the evidence. St. Clair was evidence for a rule
of law in Maryland embodying the Rabinowitz approach to the Fourth
Amendment. The Rabinowitz approach is now constitutionally discredited.71 With the erosion of its doctrinal base, St. Clair simply
cannot stand alone. It is now an anachronism surviving beyond its time.
The inventory search of an automobile in Maryland rests ultimately
upon the single authority of St. Clair. Since 1967, Mackall v. State 78
and Plitko v. State79 have upheld inventory searches, but both cases
relied upon the ultimate authority of St. Clair and are no stronger than
the foundation upon which they rest. Appropriate in this regard are the
observations of Maitland:
One has still to do for legal history something of the work
which S. R. M. did for ecclesiastical history-to teach men, e.g.,
that some statement about the thirteenth century does not
become the truer because it has been constantly repeated, that
"a chain of testimony" is never stronger than its first link."°
For present purposes, St. Clair is the "first link."
The cases of Reagan v. State' and Kleinbart v. State"2 factually
distinguished St. Clair and did not have to wrestle with the issue of its
continuing vitality. Kleinbart noted, in passing, the limited utility of
Cooper v. California:
The rationale in Cooper is not here applicable since the
contents of the automobile was not contraband and since the car
was not required to be seized by any state law, nor was it
subject to forfeiture. 3

76. Id. at 766, 768.
77. On November 3, 1975, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in South Dakota v.
Opperman, 228 N.W.2d 152 (S.D. 1975), a case involving the inventory search of an
automobile. 96 S.Ct. 264 (1975). Given the current tone of that Court, Rabinowitz may
be resuscitated. Whatever "binding" effect such a decision might have, it does not
diminish the moral conviction behind the argument here being made.
78. 7 Md. App. 246, 255 A.2d 98 (1969).
79. 11 Md. App. 35, 272 A.2d 669 (1971).

80. H.A.L.

FISHER, FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, DOWNING PROFESSOR OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND;
A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 2-3 (Cambridge, 1910).

81. 4 Md. App. 590, 244 A.2d 623 (1968).
82. 2 Md. App. 183, 234 A.2d 288 (1967).
83. Id. at 194, 234 A.2d at 295.

216

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 5

Although Dixon v. State"4 was not required to meet the broad
constitutional question squarely,"5 it implicitly turned a skeptical eye
toward the entire matrix of St. Clair, Rabinowitz and the inventory
search rationale.
THE INVENTORY SEARCH RATIONALE GENERALLY
Stripped then of automatic reliance upon Cooper, Rabinowitz and
St. Clair, how does the phenomenon of the inventory search fare upon
its own merits? It cannot rest upon the legal fiction that it is not a
"search." The Court in Terry v. Ohio 6 reasoned:
In our view the sounder course is to recognize that the
Fourth Amendment governs all intrusions by agents of the
public upon personal security, and to make the scope of the
particular intrusion, in light of all the exigencies of the case, a
central element in the analysis of reasonableness .... This seems
preferable to an approach which attributes too much significance to an overly technical definition of "search,"...s"
In balancing the Fourth Amendment protection of privacy against
the ostensibly salutary purpose of the inventory search, the scales tip
emphatically toward the Fourth Amendment protection. The only
justification offered for the inventory search is the protection of the
personal property of the arrestee and the protection of the police
against false claims of theft. A thorough-going analysis of the two
competing interests that hang in the balance when the police seek to
make an inventory search was made by Judge Stanley Mosk in Mozzetti
v. Superior Court of Sacramento County :8
It seems undeniable that a routine police inventory of the
contents of an automobile involves a substantial invasion into
the privacy of the vehicle owner. Regardless of professed
benevolent purposes and euphemistic explication, an inventory
search involves a thorough exploration by the police into the
private property of an individual.

The interests of a vehicle owner are said to be protected by
police inventory because the procedure provides the owner with
a detailed list of the articles taken into custody by the police,
84. 23 Md. App. 19, 327 A.2d 516 (1974).
85. The direct holding of Dixon is that there was not a bona fide inventory made in that
case. It was held that the "inventory" was a mere subterfuge for an exploratory search
for evidence.

86. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

87. Id. at 19, n. 15.
88. 4 Cal. 3d 699, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412, 484 P.2d 84 (1971).
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an itemization he can use in making valid claims for loss or
damage against the police and the storage bailee. Also, the
inventory brings to light articles of special value or of a
perishable nature which might require unusual care by the
police and the storage bailee.
... In weighing the necessity of the inventory search as
protection of the owner's property against the owner's rights
under the Fourth Amendment, we observe that items of value
left in an automobile to be stored by the police may be
adequately protected merely by rolling up the windows, locking
the vehicle doors and returning the keys to the owner. The
owner himself, if required to leave his car temporarily, could do
no more to protect his property.8 9
The utility of the inventory in terms of protecting the defendant
against theft or protecting the police against false charges of theft is
also highly doubtful. One writer has stated:
If the inventory does, in fact, protect the defendant against
theft and the police against false charges of theft, its use might
be justified. However, it is at least doubtful that inventories
serve any purpose other than as a means of a warrantless search
for evidence. If the arrestee or a third person subsequently
brings a civil action for the alleged loss of property from the
vehicle, the burden is on the claimant to prove that the article
was left in the automobile and that the bailee failed to return it.
The only possible situation in which the inventory would aid
the claimant would be if the missing articles appeared on the
inventory receipt. However, if the article was stolen either
before the inventory or perhaps innocently omitted when the
inventory was taken, the inventory would be to the claimant's
disadvantage. Furthermore, the inventory would be of only
limited benefit to the bailee or the police if the missing articles
were not listed on the inventory receipt. First, the inventory is
prepared by the police and is to some extent a self-serving
document. Second, even if the police have the arrestee
acknowledge the inventory by signing the receipt, the inventory
would not be binding on a third party claimant. In any of the
possible permutations, absent a special statutory provision, the
inventory would not be conclusive of the issue. 90
Boulet v. State9 ' noted the inappropriateness of an inventory search
as a protection for the police against false claims of theft:
89. Id. at 705-07, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 416-17, 484 P.2d at 88-89.
90. Comment, The Aftermath of Cooper v. California: Warrantless Automobile Searches in
illinois, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 401, 407-08 (1968).
91. 17 Ariz. App. 64, 495 P.2d 504 (1972).
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We would first observe that the taking of an inventory does not
insure the safety of the contents nor does it ipso facto prevent
an owner from later claiming that goods had been stolen or
damaged.
We fail to see how the taking of an inventory will insulate the
police against false accusations of theft and assure the property
owner that his property will not be taken. Unscrupulous
persons who desire to steal articles will simply not list them on
the inventory. Owners who wish to assert spurious claims
against law enforcement officers or the garage owners can
simply claim that the officers did not list them on the
inventory.9 2
In terms of protecting the personal property of the driver, it is
inconceivable that this benevolence should be pressed upon him at the
expense of his Fourth Amendment right to privacy without giving him
any option in the matter.93 As one commentator has stated:
To protect the contents of the vehicle from theft has been
offered as another justification. This view appears likewise
inadequate. Arrestees should be allowed to assume the risk of
loss by asking to leave their own vehicle at the roadside or by
requesting that someone be contacted to pick up the car. It is
true that when a car must be impounded the risk that some
items will be removed when the car is taken to a garage may still
be present. But even if this small risk does exist, it is
unreasonable to think that the owner would exchange Fourth
Amendment rights for unwanted protection against theft. In
short, this supposed justification turns the Fourth Amendment
on its head.9 4
A growing body of law is recognizing that a threshold prerequisite to
any inventory search of an automobile is, at the very least, an initial
lawful and reasonable impounding of that vehicle, or other exercise of
custody over the vehicle.9" In Virgil v. Superior Court of County of
Placer,9 6 the California Court of Appeals held that an inventory search
of a car impounded by the police after its driver had been arrested for
reckless driving was unlawful. Police custody of the car was held
unjustifiable since no reason appeared why the driver's friends, who had
92. Id. at 68-69, 495 P.2d at 508-09.
93. In Virgil v. Superior Court of County of Placer, 268 Cal. App. 2d 127, 73 Cal. Rptr. 793
(1968), the court ruled a search unconstitutional because the arresting officer did not
consult the driver's wishes or the willingness of his companions to drive the car to a place
of safety, but persisted in searching the car over the driver's protest.
94. Comment, Chimel v. California:A PotentialRoadblock to Vehicle Searches, 17 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 626, 641 (1970).
95. See Annotation, Lawfulness of "Inventory Search" of Motor Vehicle Impounded by
Police, 48 A.L.R. 3d 537, 544, 551-54, 577 (1973).
96. 268 Cal. App. 2d 127, 73 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1968).
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been passengers in the car, could not have taken charge of the vehicle.
The California court pointed out that a critical factor in the case was
the failure of the arresting officer to consult with the driver as to his
wishes with respect to his automobile.9 7 In People v. Nagel,9" the
California Court of Appeals for the Second District invalidated another
inventory search of an automobile because of its belief that police
custody of the car was neither necessary nor proper. The defendant had
been arrested for running a red light and there was no apparent reason
why he could not have driven the vehicle to a nearby place for
safekeeping.9 9 In United States v. Pannell,' the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals invalidated an inventory search of an automobile,
holding that the impounding of the automobile was unlawful where,
after a driver was arrested for driving without a permit, there was no
showing that the car, parked on a lot, was in any way obstructing police
operations. This was precisely the situation dealt with by the Maryland
Court of Special Appeals in Dixon v. State, wherein it reasoned:
The necessity for impounding the car was not remotely
demonstrated. The appellant's car, at the time of arrest, was on
the parking lot of the Howard County Courthouse. It was still
before noon on a working day. There was no apparent danger to
the car or to its contents. The car, in turn, posed no
irremediable danger to the flow of traffic. Either the appellant
himself or one of the officers, within a few feet and within a
few seconds, could have safely parked it, locked it and left it.
The officer was asked why he called the tow truck. In view of
the obvious and simple alternative of moving the car a few feet
into a readily available parking space, the answer strikes us as
disingenuous, "It was parked out here in the lane that runs
through the Court House parking lot and was obstructing
traffic." It is simply not reasonable to tow a car away to avoid
moving it to the curb.' 0 '
It is unrealistic to see in the justifications advanced for the inventory
search any substantial counterweight to the basic Fourth Amendment
protection of privacy. The failure to consult the wishes of the
individual concerned makes a mockery of the claim that the search is in
the interest of protecting his personal property. It would be of small
comfort to go to the penitentiary, reassured that you are there only
because the police were adamant in protecting you from petty theft
regardless of whether you wished such protection. To permit an
otherwise prohibited intrusion because it is "routine police policy" is to
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 131, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
17 Cal. App. 3d 492, 95 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1971).
See also People v. Greenwood, 174 Colo. 500, 484 P.2d 1217 (1971).
256 A.2d 925 (D.C. App. 1969).
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allow the Fourth Amendment protection to "approach the evaporation
point."' 2 Police routine cannot be the constitutional touchstone
unless we are willing to entrust our liberties to the discretion of the
police commissioner. Johnson v. United States 0 3 taught us, "When the
right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule,
to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government
enforcement agent."' 0 4 Neither is so fundamental a decision to be
entrusted to a police commissioner in the guise of promulgating routine
departmental procedures. The inventory search is, in the last analysis,
neither a legitimate exception to the warrant requirement in its own
right nor a prior valid intrusion into a constitutionally protected area
within the contemplation of the "plain view" doctrine.
For American law enforcement, resort to the device of the inventory
is creating a credibility gap of mammoth proportions. In the vast
majority of cases, it is patently "a case more of investigative
opportunism than of genuine solicitude for personal property."'0 5 It
invites the very skepticism voiced by the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals in Dixon:
There was no apparent reason why either the impounding or
the inventorying was necessary in terms of protecting any
personal property that might have been in the vehicle. The
appellant himself could have been booked at the nearby
stationhouse for the traffic violation and returned to his car
well before the afternoon had waned. His sister, alternatively,
could have been notified to come and pick it up. To have
impounded the car and towed it away, under these circumstances, was a bizarre thing to do, explainable only as a
subterfuge to search the car. We cannot credit the officer's
representation that his sole purpose in searching the car before
turning it over to the tow truck was to discover "valuable
personal property, to keep for the defendant, so nothing would
happen to it." As the officer acknowledged, easier alternatives
were readily available and no explanation was offered as to why
they might not have sufficed. 0 6
In short, an automobile is a constitutionally protected area in which
the owner has a rightful expectation of privacy against unwarranted
intrusion. An intrusion thrust upon him without his consent and
sometimes against his express wishes in the guise of doing him a favor
is,in most of its applications, an epic hypocrisy and is flagrantly
unconstitutional.
102. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at 765.
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